

23 March 1966

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence**

**SUBJECT: CIA Attribution on Maps**

1. In response to your inquiry regarding the CIA attribution on maps raised during your tour of the Cartography Division, the following is pertinent:
2. The Cartography Division exercises control over the quantity of printed cartography and its distribution. Quantities are determined in consultation with the requester and known Map Library requirements. Control is rigid in all cases where "limited" distribution is required. A high percentage of CIA-produced maps, however, are made available to other Government agencies. Unclassified items, additionally, are often distributed worldwide through USIA, AID, State, etc. Routinely, selected unclassified maps are placed in the Library of Congress.
3. All maps and graphics produced by the Cartography Division are identified by a serial number, together with month and year of production, in the lower left corner of map. All those which are classified are, additionally, identified with "CIA"; the unclassified ones do not have the CIA credit.
4. We recognize some of the arguments which would tend to favor inclusion of the CIA credit on all maps and graphics. Crediting all our production to CIA probably would add to the prestige of the Agency. Attribution would also denote the authority of the data, which is particularly important when a map is distributed separately from a text. It may be appropriate, too, that graphics used within the intelligence community to portray the activities of the Agency be clearly identified with the producer.
5. There are other considerations, however, which should be cited:
  - a. Unclassified maps now distributed under existing procedures divulge some of the interests and activities of the Agency, even as to the timing. By the nature of unclassified publications our maps are frequently listed on accession lists prepared by other libraries inside and outside of Government. Also, maps deposited in the Library of Congress are available, with some restriction and control, to the public.

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b. Identification with CIA would create a number of problems to many of the recipients. [REDACTED]

Exception would have to be made also for Department of State publications for which we produce cartography.

c. The unclassified maps are used for exchange purposes in the joint map procurement program.

d. Wider availability of CIA-produced maps would increase the burden and cost of making, filing and dissemination.

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**6. Conclusions and Recommendations:**

a. It has been OBI policy to provide the widest possible dissemination of maps and graphics within the limiting considerations of security and the extra burden which dissemination implies. The existing system is an outgrowth of professional experience and the judgment that security considerations outweigh the advantages wholesale attribution would promote.

b. The intelligence community is cognizant of our work and, by association, can generally identify our unclassified production. The procedures effected by OBI permit the optimum distribution of unclassified production throughout the Government and selected other agencies.

c. Recommend a continuation of present policy.

**JAMES A. BRAMMELL**  
**Director of Basic Intelligence**

Distribution:  
Orig & 1 - addressee  
2 - OBI

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D/OBI: [REDACTED]:nh

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